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Abstract 
We examine the relationship between privatization and growth of transition countries in 
Europe by using relative income and grouping them by ex-ante factors and by ex-post associations.  
For transition countries with comparable pre-1991 data also - Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, and 
Romania or BHPR countries - privatization/regime change to market economy increased their 
annual catching-up-to-Germany from 0.90% to 1.50% but the increase was not due to higher TFP.  
It entirely occurred after they joined the EU, and is entirely due to higher contribution of human 
capital.   Privatization did not impose short run costs on all countries while making CIS countries 
fell-behind very sharply.  The greatly divergent post-transition growth both in the short and the 
long term cannot be explained by differing emphasis on external versus domestic liberalization.  
Catching-up of “new” ex-socialist SBCS countries (Slovenia, Baltic countries, the Czech republic 
and Slovakia) occurred only after they joined the EU.  Human capital and TFP explain their growth 
while for Croatia and Serbia it is physical capital and TFP.  Negative contribution of human capital 
is the sole reason underlying falling-behind of the CIS countries.  Based on 1991-2013 catching-
up/falling-behind, CIS countries have no prospect of ever equaling German income, pre-2004 EU 
Western-Europe will reach income equality with Germany in 70 years, BHPR countries in 72; 
SBCS countries in 104, and Croatia and Serbia in 193 years. 
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Privatization and growth: natural experiments  
with European economies in transition 
 
1. Introduction 
   
Economists have recognized that Solow (1956) and Swan (1956) model’s physical capital, 
labor in efficiency units, and technology are “proximate” factors for growth that depend on 
“fundamentals” like institutions, colonial heritage, religious or legal traditions, culture.1  North’s 
(1990) contribution emphasizing the role of institutions in growth is seminal.  He defined them as 
“rules of the game... or... humanly devised constraints . . . that structure incentives in human 
exchange, whether political, social, or economic.”  Rules of the game may either be codified in 
written laws, regulations, and instructions or they may be cultural traits, unwritten conventions 
and practices.  Nunn (2014).  If so, institutions overlap with cultural and legal traditions.   
  Jones and Romer (2010) highlight four state variables now at the center of growth theory 
- ideas, institutions, population, and human capital. They model three of them and specifically 
refrain from modeling institutions.  Fuchs-Schundeln and Hassan (2016), defining institutions 
more precisely (following Acemoglu, 2009), separate them from social structure, and culture.  
Institutions are “the broad set of rules, regulations, laws, and policies that affect economic 
incentives and thus the incentives to invest in technology, physical capital, and human capital” 
while social structure is the network of friendships, family ties, and socioeconomic stratification 
(e.g., the class structure) that affects spread of information and ability to enforce contracts and 
culture essentially means civic capital that overcomes free rider problem.  It is not feasible for one 
to conduct controlled experiments for any of the three at the level of countries.  That leaves natural  
                                                 
 1See, Rodrik (2003), Acemoglu et al. (2005).  See, also Kant (2016) for additional 
references.    
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experiments as the best means of drawing the causal relationships for all three. 
 As noted by Djankov and Murrell (2002), privatization of ownership and liberalization of 
markets in ex-socialist countries provide an excellent natural experiment to economists in view of 
their fast and all-encompassing introduction.  Different theoretical models predict a positive 
relationship of privatization/liberalization with growth.  In general equilibrium framework, 
Gylfason (1998) employing a two-sector full employment model and Hansen (1997) with an 
imperfect competition model, predict that privatization and market (instead of administered) prices 
either act like removing a price distortion through price reform/trade liberalization or enhances 
micro-economic efficiency through a broad distribution of ownership rights.  These conclusions 
are supported by empirical studies by Berkowitz and DeJong (2003) for post-Soviet Russia; but 
not by Bennett et al. (2007) for 26 transition economies for 1990–2003, and Cieslik and 
Tarsalewska (2013) for 24 such economies for 1993-2006.  On the speed of privatization, Bennett 
et al. (2007) report mass privatization led to greater post-privatization growth boost than gradual 
privatization while Gouret (2007) does not.   
 Estrin et al. (2009) using EBRD’s Transition Reports 1998-2007 data find privatization 
affected efficiency, profitability, revenues of firms mostly positively in Central Europe, while its 
effects on CIS states are statistically insignificant.  Summarizing empirical macro studies, they 
find privatization has a positive effect on growth – especially when accompanied by 
complementary reforms – but whether mass privatization (often largely to insiders) has a stronger 
effect is not clear.  The expected vast improvement from poor performance during the centrally 
planned period has not occurred partly due to sharp recession immediately following the launch of 
privatization.  Using the 1995-2008 levels of Heritage Foundation’s index of economic freedom 
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(IEE) for most of the post-socialist countries, Piatek et. al (2013) find IEE, but not political 
freedom, Granger causes faster growth. 2 
 Performing a meta-analysis of 60 empirical studies published from 1996-2013 of the first 
generation structural reforms in 26 transition economies, Babecky and Havranek (2014) find the 
reforms had substantial costs to growth in the short-run but more positive effects in the long-run, 
especially when they were focused on removing trade and capital account controls.  Dell’Anno 
and Villa (2013) construct a broad index of institutional change for 1990-2008 from EBRD’s 
transition (or reform) indicators for 27 Central and Eastern Europe and Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) transition economies.  They show that higher speed of reforms Granger 
causes growth (measured as an average for 27 countries) but not vice-versa.  Eicher and Schreiber 
(2010) exploit the relatively large changes during transition, and construct a structural policy index 
by summing up EBRD’s relevant liberalization indices from 1991-2001 for 26 transition countries.  
They find large short-term effects of structural policy on growth using a panel with fixed effects; 
or, alternatively, using “independence,” (how politically free a country was in 1988) as instrument 
for economic institutions. 
 European economies in transition also provide setting for a second natural experiment.  On 
May 1, 2004, the following transition economies joined the European Union: the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia.  They were soon followed 
by Bulgaria and Romania (on January 1, 2007).  Upon joining, they were required to follow EU 
standards, norms, regulations, and practices.  Such a large number of countries adopting EU norms 
                                                 
 2They find more than half of the CIS countries were not politically free, and had decreasing 
political rights over this period. 
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at the same time also provides a natural setting to answer whether or not adopting EU norms and 
standards enhances growth or worsens it.   
 As far as I can tell, none of the studies cited above have examined growth effects of either 
EU accession or of privatization/regime change from a command to a market economy by 
grouping countries by either ex-ante factors or by ex-post associations. Longer-term (i.e., pre-
1991) comparable data, that is available for ex-socialist countries that that have been separate 
countries since the Second World War (Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, and Romania), is eminently 
suitable for conducting a natural experiment for comparative study of growth effects of the two 
regimes: Command vs. Market.  The other ex-socialist countries that emerged or re-emerged as 
independent new countries in 1991/1993, (and for which comparable pre1991 data is unavailable 
in any comprehensive way) can also be grouped by whether they had civil war as they became 
independent and separate countries or whether post-transition they formed into CIS or whether 
they aspired to join, and then joined, the EU instead.  This permits us to conduct the second natural 
experiment: Whether adopting EU norms and standards has any effect on growth.  
 We use the longest comparable data that is available for transition economies to examine 
the open questions of the mechanism  of privatization leading to economic success, if any; and 
their lessons for long term growth for developing countries. 3  See, Estrin et al. (2009).  These 
questions are empirically analyzed using data for countries in Central and Eastern Europe and the 
former Soviet Union preceding transition (if available) and following transition to a market-
                                                 
3The splitting of Czechoslovakia into its two parts, the break-up of the former U.S.S.R. 
into its constituent republics, and the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia led to emergence or re-
emergence of many independent countries in 1991/1993. 
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economy in 1991.  We analyze the effects of privatization/regime from a command to a market 
economy for countries that have existed as separate countries since at least the Second World War 
in Section 2.  The effects for countries that attained separate statehood for the first time in 
1991/1993, are analyzed in Section 3.  Section 4 concludes. 
2. “Old” ex-socialist countries under different regimes 
 Two indices have been used to identify privatization/economic reforms in the literature on 
transition: Heritage Foundation’s index of economic freedom and EBRD’s transition (or reform) 
indicators.  We prefer the latter since it is available from 1989 (as opposed to 1995 for the former).  
EBRD rates the following indicators on a scale of 1 (little progress or lowest level) to 4.33 
(attainment of advanced industrial economy standards): Large-scale privatization, small-scale 
privatization, governance and enterprise restructuring, price liberalization, trade and foreign 
exchange system, and competition policy.  For the “old” ex-socialist countries for which we have 
relevant data, called BHPR (Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, and Romania) countries hereinafter, sum 
of these indicators rose very rapidly from the lowest level (6 to 8.7) in 1989.  Although we do not 
have comparable data for the pre-1991 period, it is reasonable to assume these countries were at 
the same level of privatization/ liberalization (i.e., little) in the pre-1991 period as they were in 
1989-1990.  
We use the PWT data for income (and other variables) since it goes back the farthest.  
RGDP in its versions starting with 8.0 (the next generation, see, Feenstra et al. (2015)), permit real 
GDP comparisons across countries as well as over time; and we use its most recent version 9.0 
(available at http://www.rug.nl/ggdc/productivity/pwt) that gives data to 2014.  It is available for 
Romania since 1960 and for Bulgaria, Hungary, and Poland since 1970.  For these countries it 
provides a natural experiment to analyze long-term performance under two different regimes:  
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socialism and market economy.4   
Figure 1 shows the three-year moving average (to smooth out short-run fluctuations) of 
PPP PCY index with base-years 1961 for Romania (and Germany) and 1971 for the other three 
countries.  German income grew at an average of 2.5 %  between 1961 to 2013, was the least 
volatile, and exhibited no sharp change in or around 1990.  Income ratios are frequently used in 
growth and transition studies.  For example, Peron and Rey (2012) use time series analysis to 
examine the distribution of Indian Ocean Zone (IOZ) countries’ incomes ratio to the IOZ average, 
and to the world mean income, Cuberes and Jerzmanowski (2009) examine growth reversals using 
real output per worker relative to the US, Fuchs-Schundeln (2008) use German Reunification as a 
natural experiment to study its effect on East-West Germany saving-ratio, income-ratio, and 
wealth ratio, and Jones and Olken (2008) find growth “miracles” and “failures, defined as growth 
relative to the US, are ubiquitous at ten-year periods.   Svejnar (2002) compares Soviet bloc’s 
growth to a corresponding group of market economies.  Nevertheless, none of these studies use 
either a catch-up index or explanatory variables also as ratios.   
Following Kant (2018), the catch-up index, that is based on income ratios, is defined as 
follows.  Let yJ0 and yBM0 represent Country J’s per-capita RGDP for the base year and the bench 
mark country’s per-capita RGDP for Country J’s base year, and RJ0 Country J’s base per capita 
RGDP ratio.  We assume the bench mark country is the richer country, for all time periods under  
                                                 
 4Ver. 9.0 uses PPPs from the international comparison project (ICP) 2011 that removes 
some of the distortions of ICP 2005 used in PWT 8.0/8.1 (e.g., inclusion in ICP 2005 of many 
products typical in the consumption baskets of high-income countries that are high-priced luxury 
items in low-income countries).  See, World Bank (2013, 2014) and Inklaar and Rao (2017).   
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study.  Then,  
RJ0 = (yJ0/yBM0) < 1.        (1) 
For each subsequent year, similar ratios of a country’s annual per-capita RGDP to that of the bench 
mark country are computed.  The catch-up index for Country J for year t is the ratio of its per capita 
RGDP ratio for year t to its base per capita RGDP ratio. Let IJt represent this index.  Then,  
IJt = (RJt/ RJ0)          (2) 
IJt is the index of income ratios.  By converting all income ratios to the same base, the 
catch-up index helps us identify the breaks/turning points, and compare/combine different 
countries’ experience. It is depicted for the four countries with respect to Germany for all available 
years in Figure 2.5  Its increase shows relative convergence (that is not sufficient for absolute 
convergence, i.e., for income gap to decrease), while its decrease shows both relative and absolute 
divergence (since, relative divergence is sufficient for absolute divergence). All BHPR countries 
exhibit both catching-up (relative convergence, RC) and falling back (relative divergence, RD).6 
                                                 
 5We use Germany as the anchor country since post-transition convergence of East 
European and CIS countries is often examined to it. 
6Although Romania’s index dominates Figure 2, it experiences falling behind from 1985 
to 1992 and recovers its 1985 relative income only in 2006.  Similarly, Bulgaria falls behind from 
its peak relative income in 1988 to a level below the 1971 level by 1998 and has still not re-attained 
the 1988 level.  That is, it fails to catch-up for 25 years.  Romania, and Bulgaria fail to catch-up 
for 21 years (1985-2006), and 25 years (1988-2013), respectively.  Similarly, Poland shows no 
catching-up for 24 years (1971- 1995) and Hungary for 20 years (1983-2013).  Catching-up of 
none of these countries is consistent and steady. 
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Nevertheless, 1991 (or, just around 1991) marks a break-point/change in the previous trend 
(confirmed by cusum-of-squares test) for all four countries: Bulgaria from RC to RD, and Poland 
from no RC/RD to RC, and the other two countries from RD to no RC/RD for Romania and RC 
for Hungary. Thus, start of the privatization and market economy period in 1990/1991 marks the 
end of absolute income divergence for three out of four Eastern Europe ex-socialist countries for 
which data are available for the earlier period also.   
 Table 1 computes the average (geometric mean) catching-up rate for the BHPR countries 
separately for the two periods.7 The catching-up rate for the post-1991 period is more than one-
half point higher.  The catching-up growth in the post-socialist period is higher and (as seen in 
Figure 2), the falling behind is less frequent.  Nevertheless, the evidence of BHPR countries does 
not support the conclusion of Estrin et al. (2009) that centrally planned economies had poor 
economic performance in the pre-transition and were just waiting for privatization and market 
economy to burst into rapid growth.  Eicher and Schreiber (2010), using a panel for 1991-2001 of 
26 ex-socialist countries, find a mere 10% change in quality of structural policies (measured by 
EBRD’s TIs) raises annual growth by 2.7%.  We find the whole-scale adoption of privatization 
and structural change from command to market economy by BHPR countries increased growth 
rate by only 0.5 points.  
                                                 
 7We prefer geometric mean (GM) as the average – like median, (and unlike arithmetic 
mean) it is not affected much by extreme values (e.g., GM of 8, 27, and 125 is 30); unlike median, 
it incorporates the values of all observations in it.  Further, appendix Table 1 gives their 
performance over the longest period for which we have comparable and reliable data.  
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Next we examine the results of the natural experiment of joining EU.  All four BHPR 
countries joined EU - Hungary and Poland in the middle of 2004, and Bulgaria and Romania on 
the first day of 2007.  Panel C of Table 3 gives their catch-up to the EU accession year.  
Surprisingly, for 14 years of privatization/shift to a market economy, their economic performance 
was the same as during the command economy.  That is, all the post-transition better economic 
performance came only after they joined EU.  Privatization/mere shift to the market economy was 
not sufficient to boost growth; it required adopting EU norms and standards also. 
Based on Solow (1957), comparative standards of living have been explained either in 
levels or in their growth.  The former decomposes cross-section differences in output per worker 
levels into differences in physical capital-labor ratios, quality of human capital, and productivity.  
See, Caselli (2005) and Feenstra et al. (2015).  The latter explains growth in output per worker by 
growth in the right hand side variables.  The regressions are run for about 100 or more countries, 
and the results averaged across countries and across each decade.  See, Jorgenson and Vu (2010).  
Our interest is in explaining changes in the catch-up index and income ratios overtime.  Let 
kl represent physical capital per unit of employed labor, hc average human capital (that is based 
on years of schooling and Mincerian returns to education), and A the efficiency with which the 
factors are used, i.e., TFP. 8  Letting per capita income approximate output per worker, ignoring 
the time sub-scripts, and using the neo-classical production function, e.g., as given in Caselli  
(2005), for Country J,  
                                                 
 8PWT 9.0 and 8.0 call their human capital measure an “index.”  See, Feenstra et al. (2015), 
Inklaar and Timmer (2013) and PWT 9.0.  We prefer the nomenclature “human capital measure” 
or “average human capital” since the values are not expressed as a ratio to a base year’s values.   
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yJ = AJ  klJ  
α hcJ 
1 - 
 
α        (3) 
Then, Country J’s income ratio to the US is,  
 (yJ/yUS) = (AJ/AUS) 
 (klJ/klUS)
α   (hcJ/hcUS) 
1 - α     (4) 
(4) tells us Country J’s income ratio depends on ratios of the two TFPs, the two capital-
labor ratios and the two average human capital.  As noted above, Peron and Rey (2012), Cuberes 
and Jerzmanowski (2009), Jones and Olken (2008), and Fuchs-Schundeln (2008), use income 
relative to the US as the dependent variable.  But do not take explanatory variables as relative to 
the corresponding US/a bench mark country’s numbers in their econometric investigation.  
 We estimate (4) (rather than use the catch-up index on the left hand-side and express the 
right hand-side ratios as indices too).  We also do not take three-year moving-average values 
thereby obtaining data for 1960/1970 and 2014 as well.  The estimable version of (4) is: 
(yJ/yUS)t = µ +  β1 (AJ/AUS)t + β2  (klJ/klUS)t + β3 (hcJ/hcUS)t + εt  (5) 
 We undertake panel estimation of (5); separately for 1960/1970 to 1991, 1991 to 2014, 
1991 to EU accession, and EU accession to 2014.  These data are available in PWT 9.0 for these 
periods for BHPR countries.  We take annual data rather than that averaged over five or ten non-
overlapping years since the latter throws away too much information.  See, Attanasio et al. (2000).   
In panel estimation, following Kennedy (2008), we first test the null that the intercepts are equal.  
If this null is accepted, pooled OLS estimation is used.  If it is rejected, we apply the Hausman test 
to test if the random effects model is unbiased.  If this null is not rejected, we used the random 
effects model; if this null is rejected, we use the fixed effects model.   
Table 2 presents panel estimation results for income ratios for the two periods, and the 
second period’s two sub-periods, for BHPR countries.  The panels for each period is unbalanced.  
Based on the above considerations, all four panels are estimated by pooled OLS since they do not 
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reject Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier test of equal intercepts.  All pooled OLS estimates are 
equal to the corresponding random-effect estimates.  Surprisingly, TFP’s contribution to catching-
up is almost the same for the pre-transition and post-transition periods.  Estrin et al. (2009) find 
the effect of privatization of state-owned enterprises on efficiency and TFP is mostly positive in 
Central Europe.  We do not find privatization-boosted TFP contributed more to income in BHPR 
countries after privatization than it did before privatization.  The only reason for boost to income 
growth in the post EU accession period is the almost double contribution of human capital.  It more 
than makes up for the decline in the contribution of physical capital to income in the post-transition 
period. 
Comparing the two sub-periods of the post-transition period, human capital is not 
significant in the first, and physical capital is significant at 10% level in the second.  All other 
coefficients are significant at 1% level.  Although the contribution of TFP declines,  the said 
decline is more than made up by human capital in the post EU accession period - its contribution 
is almost four times what it was in the socialist and the 1991 to EU-accession periods (although 
the latter effect is not statistically significant).  Human capital entirely explains the higher catching-
up by BHPR countries in both the post-socialist and the post-EU-accession periods.   
3. “New” ex-socialist countries 
 This section analyzes the catching-up experience and growth factors for ex-socialist entities 
that came into being or re-emerged as separate independent countries in 1991/1993 by i) the break-
up of the former U.S.S.R. into its constituent republics, ii) the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia, 
and iii) the splitting of Czechoslovakia into its two parts; limiting ourselves to countries for which 
data on explanatory variables are available.  We divide these countries into three groups based on 
the following ex ante and ex post factors: whether they aspired to EU membership and joined it in 
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2000s, whether their separation accompanied internecine war for many years, and whether formed 
into CIS.  The first group consists of Slovenia, the Baltic countries, the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia, called hereinafter as SBCS countries, who joined EU in the middle of 2004 (and were 
under the Soviet system for about five decades); the second of ex-Yugoslavia countries Croatia 
and Serbia, (and were under the Soviet system for about four decades); and the third group of ex-
Soviet Union countries, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Russian Federation, 
Tajikistan and Ukraine, (and were under the Soviet system for about seven decades).9 
Table 3A presents catching-up results for “new” ex-socialist countries in three panels: 
Panel I for SBCS countries; Panel II for Croatia and Serbia; and Panel III  for CIS countries, The 
“new” ex-socialist countries have experienced significantly worse economic performance than 
“old” ex-socialist (BHPR) countries over the same period.  The three groups of “new” ex-Socialist 
countries have caught-up/fallen-behind Germany (that grew at 2.5%) at 0.61%, 0.58%, and -2.19 
% rate, respectively - versus 1.50 % catching-up for the “old” socialist countries.  Megginson 
(2005) found that mass privatization did not yield the expected positive results.  We find the results 
varied greatly among the four groups of ex-socialist countries with them arranged in the following 
descending order: “old” ex-socialist (BHPR),  SBCS, Croatia and Serbia, and CIS - even though 
all four groups had almost the same trajectory of privatization and transition to a market economy.  
See, Figure 3. 
 We also find that, in contrast to Svejnar (2002), i) Balkan and Baltic countries, Romania, 
Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, and Bulgaria, on average have performed better than the Central 
European countries of Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, and the Czech Republic in the post-
transition period (indicating that geography-related initial conditions have not held the former 
                                                 
 9Due to its limited period under EU, we ignore Croatia joining EU in the middle of 2013. 
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group back); and ii) Slovenia and the BHPR countries (other than Bulgaria) did not have a larger 
relative income gap with advanced economies like Germany in 2001 than at the start of the 
transition.10  
Figure 4 shows the dynamics of the average (GM) catch-up index for the four groups of 
ex-socialist countries for the 1991-2013 period.  Roland (2000) finds no transition country avoided 
a serious and major output fall at the beginning of transition.  We find the BHPR countries hardly 
show any falling-behind (Germany’s growth).  SBCS and Croatia and Serbia groups more than 
fully recover after an initial falling-behind.  CIS countries fall-behind sharply for about ten years 
and their relative income was about 40% lower in 2013 than what it was in 1991.  Roland (2000) 
explains the initial fall to credit crunch, snapping of network externalities and freedom to engage 
in monopoly behavior by enterprises.  Yet, he does not explain why these factors had no effect on 
BHPR countries and such strong effect in CIS countries (that their income gap from Germany is 
so much higher in 2013 than it was in 1991 - since relative divergence is sufficient for absolute 
divergence).    
Figure 5 depicts the transition indicator (TI) for only the liberalization of trade and foreign 
exchange system for the four groups of ex-socialist countries - they are far closer to each other 
                                                 
 10Similarly, Dell’Anno and Villa (2013) find positive growth rates over 1990-2009 for all 
ex-socialist countries except Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Serbia, Tajikistan and Ukraine.  We 
find incomes of Moldova and Ukraine grew slightly, and of Serbia by about 3.3% from 1991-
2013.  Vintrova (2009) finds that the Slovak income reached 84% of the Czech’s by 2007.  We 
find the Slovak relative and absolute convergence with the Czech continued after 2007 too - by 
2013, its income was 90% of the Czech income.  
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than the aggregate TI (shown in Figure 3).  Yet, in contrast to the conclusions of Nannicini and 
Billmeier (2010) (that making the transition without opening up to trade considerably hampers 
growth) almost equal focus on external liberalization/opening up to trade did not benefit the four 
groups of countries equally whether in the short or the long-run.   
On the other hand, Berkowitz and DeJong (2003) explain the enormous regional 
differences in economic growth rates in post-Soviet Russia by regional differences in price 
liberalization policies and large-scale privatization.  Figure 6 depicts the average of price 
liberalization and large-scale privatization transition indicators for four groups of ex-socialist 
countries. The countries did not differ enormously by the extent of their price liberalization and 
large-scale privatization.  Yet, they differed greatly in their growth and catching-up rates.  What it 
suggests is that markets cannot be given a completely free-reign but countries/markets need to be 
“governed” by wise politicians and technocrats or constrained by proper institutions to ensure a 
positive outcome.  See, Wade (1990). 
  Piatek et. al (2013) find causality from economic freedom to economic growth with one 
year lag using Heritage Foundation’s index of economic freedom (IEE) for the former.  They 
divide the post-socialist countries (25) in different groups, use IEE for 1995-2008, country fixed 
effects panel regression that uses a time trend instead of a constant, and lagged dependent variable 
on the RHS.  We use EBRD’s transition indicators (that are available since 1989) as indicators of 
privatization and the introduction of market economy and the next generation PWT 9.0 data (that 
goes up to 2014).  We find the post-socialist performance is not uniformly positive.  Assuming all 
ex-socialist countries in Europe were catching-up to Germany before 1991 at 0.90% annual rate, 
only BHPR countries show a slightly better post-socialist economic performance (at about one-
half point higher).  Post-socialist SBCS countries and Croatia and Serbia catch-up to Germany at  
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a lower rate, and CIS countries fall behind Germany, both relatively and absolutely. 
Further, catching-up of SBCS countries happened only after they joined EU.  Panel B of 
Table 3 shows these countries’ incomes fell behind Germany’s income for 13 years (1991 to 2004) 
since their launch of privatization and market economy.  The shift to privatization and market 
economy increased income gaps of both SBCS and CIS countries from Germany.  But, SBCS 
countries were able to stop their declining living standards vis a vis Germany after they joined EU.  
Both the i) higher catching-up of BHPR countries after privatization in 1991 (as compared to the 
period before that) and ii) all positive catching-up of SBCS countries since 1991, are entirely 
explained by the spurt in catching-up after they joined EU. 
Now we study what changed in BHPR and SBCS countries in the few years before and 
after they joined EU.  Bulgaria’s accession was delayed because EU had especial concern about 
vast amount of corruption in high positions. The EU demanded Bulgaria needed to reestablish its 
legal codes; especially the system for prosecuting and investigating criminal networks, and 
enforcing laws surrounding money laundering and fraud. (Phinnemore, 2006).  In January 2006, 
the Bulgarian legislature adopted reforms generated by the public-private initiative, Coalition 
2000, in the areas of “political level corruption, VAT fraud, a stricter system of implementation 
monitoring and a stronger mandate for the oversight government commission and in limiting or 
lifting the immunity of members of parliament and magistrates under specified conditions.”  (Pond, 
2006).   
The issues on which Hungary had to satisfy the EU before accession included bringing its 
food processing and animal slaughter houses to EU’s sanitary codes or animal health guidelines 
by the end of 2006; and its urban waste water treatment and collection systems to EU’s standards 
by the end of 2004.  (Gottfried, P. and P. Györkös, 2007).   Requirements on Poland were similar; 
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it also, at the EU’s request, agreed to open its real estate market to the EU citizens.  (Kułakowski, 
and Jesień, 2007).  Romania had to increase legal force to deal with its corruption, consolidate 
judicial and police reform and tackle issues on human rights, freedom of the press, and minority 
protection before being allowed into the EU.  (Phinnemore, 2006 and Lusman, 2014). 
Like it did with Hungary, the EU persuaded Slovenia to bring its food processing and 
animal slaughter houses to EU’s sanitary codes or animal health guidelines and its urban waste 
water treatment and collection systems to EU standards.  (Potočnik, et al. 2007).  Estonia had to 
agree to rely on other sources of power than the shale oil they had been using (environmental 
reform), satisfy EU of its hunting regulations, and revise many parts of its tax law, including its 
entire set of corporate income tax laws.  (Streimann, 2007).  Latvia agreed to limit licensing 
requirements to a narrower scale of business activities, to raise the savings guarantees in the 
national banks as well as to introduce an Investment Compensation System by 2008, and to 
restructure each one of its milk, meat, and fish processing facilities.  (Kesteris and Plamse, 2007).  
Lithuania consented to the shutting down of its two nuclear reactors, the first by 2005, and the 
second, by 2010, and to a closer enforcement of its borders with the Russian state of Kaliningrad.  
(Auštrevičius, 2007) 
On the other hand, the Czech Republic agreed to adequately staff its state aid systems and 
closure of the majority of its banks by the European Commission that the EC had deemed corrupt.  
These banks were rebuilt using foreign involvement.  (Telicka and Bartak, 2007).  Slovakia had to 
change its whole political structure in 1999 - with its first-ever presidential elections in May 1999 
- to even be considered by the EU as a candidate for negotiations.  They also had to adopt new 
laws into their constitution to align it with the needs of the European Commission and the Council 
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of Europe and to increase transparency of governmental decisions.  It had to restructure its entire 
banking structure, and to tighten tax-discipline of its business sector.  (Figel’ and Adamiš, 2007). 
Clearly, privatization, rapidly adopted in the early 1990s, was not sufficient for growth.  It 
also needed legal, judicial and police reforms, restructuring of banking, adopting EU standards 
and practices in every detail, and increased transparency and control of political level corruption.  
Berkowitz, et al. (2014) find privatizing state-owned banks in Russia did not have any impact on 
economic growth if the banks still retained political connections. We find a stronger result: mass 
privatization across all industries in ten countries (BHPR and SBCS) did not boost growth if any 
of the problems listed in the previous paragraph were present.   
Table 4 presents panel estimation results for growth factors “new” ex-socialist countries.  
Croatia and Serbia and CIS panels are strongly balanced; with 25 observations for each country.  
Croatia and Serbia panel is estimated by pooled OLS since it does not reject Breusch-Pagan 
Lagrange multiplier test of equal intercepts; as before, the pooled OLS estimates are equal to the 
corresponding random-effect estimates.  The CIS countries panels reject Breusch-Pagan Lagrange 
multiplier test of equal intercepts as well as the Hausman test of unbiased random effects.  It is 
estimated by the fixed effects model.  Two panels for SBCS countries are used: one for the period 
from 1990 to EU accession, and the other from EU accession to 2014.  The contribution of physical 
capital to growth is much smaller in the second period, and its level of significance drops from 1% 
to 10%.  On the other hand, human capital, that was not significant in the first period and had the 
negative sign, becomes significant at 1% level in the second period and has a strong positive effect.  
The only reason that explains catching-up of SBCS countries after they joined EU (as compared 
to the period before it) is human capital;  the only reason that explains falling behind of the CIS 
countries is the negative contribution of human capital.  On the other hand, only physical capital 
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and TFP explain the catching-up of Crotia and Serbia since the coefficient on human capital is 
negative.  TFP’s contribution to catching-up is more than double in SBCS countries for the post-
EU period than it is in of Crotia and Serbia.   
The above results may be contrasted to those by Dombi (2013).  Read it again. He finds 
the main source of economic growth for ten Central Eastern European (CEE) post-socialist 
countries between 1995 and 2007 to be physical capital followed by TFP; and that of human capital 
to be marginal.  We, on the other hand, do not find physical capital played an important role in 
SBCS countries in their post-EU period while the role of human capital there was strong.  On the 
other hand, Prochniak (2011) finds human capital was a very important determinant of growth for 
1993-2009 in the 10 Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries.11   
Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu (2006) and Calvo and Sanchez-Robles (2003) find 
privatization/market economy/economic freedom spur economic growth by boosting domestic and 
foreign investment.  Our results generally support these conclusions.  For each group of countries, 
the effect of physical capital on catching-up growth is positive, and is statistically significant in 
three out of four cases at 1% level.  Nevertheless, for CIS countries, this positive effect is not 
successful in preventing their falling behind in the post-socialist period.   
We have shown above that the contribution of human capital is the most important factor 
explaining both the i) higher catching-up of BHPR countries after privatization in 1991 (as 
compared to the period before that) and ii) all positive catching-up of SBCS countries since 1991  
Now, we examine whether human capital had a similar role in growth/catching-up of pre-2004 EU  
                                                 
 11Countries used by Prochniak (2011) are Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. 
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countries; i.e., countries that were EU members before its 2004 expansion.   
Table 5 presents the catching-up to Germany since 1991 of pre-2004 EU countries.  Of the 
three countries that had higher 3-year moving-average income than Germany in 1991, Denmark, 
Luxembourg and Sweden, two (Denmark and Sweden) fell behind Germany and so did more than 
half of the other countries.  Although the GM of 14-countries’ catching-up rate is slightly positive 
(0.16%, and .02% without Ireland), if these countries are collectively considered as one country 
called, say, Western Europia, its absolute income gap from Germany widened over 1991-2013 - 
since the more populous parts of Western Europia (France, Italy and U.K.) fell behind; and relative 
divergence is sufficient for absolute divergence.12 
Table 6 reports results from panel estimation of growth factors of pre-2004 EU countries.  
For ease of comparison, it also reproduces the results for growth factors for BHPR and SBCS 
countries since their accession to EU.  For all three groups of countries, TFP is not the most 
important factor; human capital is.  The negative contribution of capital-intensity for pre-2004 EU 
countries is surprising.  The capital measure is physical (tangible) capital.  It is possible this 
measure understates total capital: Some capital may be intangible capital that is mistakenly 
included in human capital. 
We also calculate and report in Tables 1 and 3 the time it will it take for ex-socialist 
countries to reach income equality with Germany, following Kant (2018).  Based on the past 
catching-up for the longest period for which we have reliable and comparable data, Appendix 
Table 1 and Tables 1 and 3 project BHPR countries will reach income equality with Germany in 
                                                 
 12Western Europia’s income fell behind Germany’s at the annual rate of 0.20% (0.23% 
excluding Ireland) during this period.  
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107 years (but 72 years if the 1991-2013 catch-up rate is used); SBCS countries in 104 years, 
Croatia and Serbia in 193 years, and CIS countries have no prospect for ever reaching income 
equality with Germany.  These results are to be taken with caution since the time for income quality 
with the benchmark country depends both on the period used for projecting into the future and the 
benchmark country considered.13  Although Kant (2018) finds that of the 28 countries in South 
Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa that caught-up to the US from 1992 to 2013, 21 fell behind over a 
longer period; and the longer period catching-up rate of most of them are one-fifth to about one-
half of the 1992-2013 rate; the European ex-socialist countries longer period performance could 
be better.  On the other hand, Table 5 shows pre-2004 EU countries as a group may reach income 
equality with Germany in 70 years (529 years excluding Ireland); and Finland, Portugal, and Spain 
in 70, 133, and 101 years, respectively.  But, if these countries are considered one country, Western 
Europia, extending its 1991-2013 falling behind to the future means it has no prospect of ever 
reaching income equality with Germany. 
4. Conclusions 
We use two natural experiments to examine the growth effects of i) privatization/regime  
                                                 
 13Comparing Appendix Table 1 to Table 1, BHPR countries’ longer term catching-up is 
slower - over 1961/1971 to 2013, it is at 1.19% rate versus the 1.50% rate for 1991-2013; and for 
two out of four countries the longer period catching-up rate is about one-third to two-thirds of the 
1991-2013 rate.  Further, all experienced no catching-up for periods ranging from 20 to 25 years. 
This happened even though all these countries are upper middle income (two) or high income 
(two) as compared to South Asian and Sub-Saharan African countries where virtually all are lower 
income or lower middle income.   
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change from command to market economy and ii) joining EU using the ex-socialist countries in 
Europe.  As far as I can tell, none of the empirical studies of this question have used data for both 
the post-1990 to the pre-1991 periods.  We use the comparable pre-1991 data also; as well as using 
the longest post-1990 data that are available, and use the catch-up index and income ratio in our 
analysis.  We group these countries into four: a) countries that have existed as separate countries 
since at least the Second World War, called BHPR (Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, and Romania), or 
“old” ex-socialist countries, and three groups of “new” ex-socialist countries:  b) Slovenia, Baltic, 
the Czech republic and Slovakia (SBCS) - who joined EU in 2014, c) Croatia and Serbia - that 
experienced civil war after the break-up of Yugoslavia, and d) ex-Soviet Union countries that 
formed into CIS. 
Estrin et al. (2009)’s conclude centrally planned economies had poor economic 
performance in the pre-transition, and were expected to vastly improve it post-transition; and 
privatization mostly affected TFP positively, implying the enhanced TFP boosted growth. Our 
analysis shows BHPR countries were catching up to Germany at 0.90% rate in the centrally 
planned period.  In the privatized and market economy period, the catching up increased by about 
0.5 points (to 1.50%); but the better performance entirely occurred only after these countries joined 
EU about 14 years later.  Similarly, SBCS countries income gap with Germany was wider in 2004 
than it was in 1991 and they caught up only after joining EU; while CIS countries fell-behind so 
sharply that they still are at about 60% of the relative income to Germany level they had in 1991.  
Privatization and shift to a market economy itself widened the income gap of most of these 
countries from Germany, but countries that joined EU were able to stop the relative divergence  
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from the year of accession.14 
In contrast to Estrin et al. (2009), we find TFP’s contribution to output for BHPR countries 
was almost the same in the post-transition and pre-transition periods.  Considering only the post-
transition period, the “new” ex-socialist countries have done worse than “old” ex-socialist 
countries and reforms did not impose any short run costs on BHPR countries.  All four groups of 
ex-socialist countries had almost the same trajectory of privatization and overall transition to a 
market economy.  Contrary to Nannicini and Billmeier (2010) and Berkowitz and DeJong (2003), 
the greatly different growth/catching-up in short/long term cannot be explained by differing 
emphasis on external or price liberalization or privatization.   
Panel estimation shows that human capital entirely explains the post-transition higher 
catching-up of BHPR countries and falling-behind of CIS countries.  While TFP is behind the 
growth/catching-up of both, in post-EU SBCS countries the additional factor is human capital 
while in Croatia and Serbia it is physical capital.  These results are different from those by Dombi 
(2013), and Prochniak (2011).  Human capital, not TFP, is the dominant factor for faster catch-up, 
or any catch-up, of all three groups of countries: BHPR and SBCS countries since their accession 
to EU, and pre-2004 EU countries. 
We also examine within group convergence and years for full convergence to Germany.  
Dispersion of absolute incomes has decreased in i) BHPR, ii) SBCS, and iii) Croatia and Serbia, 
has almost doubled in CIS countries; and has trebled for all these countries as a group from 1991-
2013.  Based on catching-up/falling-behind based on the 1991-2013 performance, CIS countries 
                                                 
 14As a point of comparison, we note that more than half of the “old” EU countries also 
fell behind Germany from 1991 to 2013.  
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have no prospect of ever equaling German income, pre-2004 EU countries will reach income 
equality with Germany in 70 years, BHPR countries in 72 years; SBCS countries in 104 years, and 
Croatia and Serbia in 193 years.   
We now note some of the implications of this paper and suggestions for further research.  
The weaker growth effects of transition in “new” ex-socialist countries might be due to the burden 
of governance as a sovereign country for the first time and undertaking regime change while 
grappling simultaneously with costs and burdens of separate statehood.  Standard scale effects 
(increasing returns in the provision of public goods and non-rivalrous technology) raise the 
administrative costs both in the main unit in the former united country/empire (e.g., Russia in the 
U.S.S.R. and Serbia in Yugoslavia) as well as in the new units that are spun off. 
Second, de jure privatization  and introduction of a market economy is not de facto 
introduction in view of ingrained habits and customs of people.  Fuchs-Schundeln and Hassan 
(2015) identify three aspects of fundamental causes of growth: institutions, social structure, and 
culture.  Even if institutions change, old social structure, and culture may persist. For example, 
Alesina and Fuchs-Schundeln (2007) and Okulicz-Kozaryn (2014) find that after 45 years under 
communism, ex-socialist countries’ residents were favorably disposed to redistribution by the state 
(and, if anything, increased their preference for redistribution) and were not ready for unbridled 
privatization, market economy and competition. 
Third, political integration does not mean economic integration.  Nitsch and Wolf (2009) 
find that although administrative barriers to trade between East and West Germany were rapidly 
eliminated with the fall of the Berlin Wall, the intra-German trade pattern has persisted along the 
former East-West border.  The persistence of old trade patterns and economic relationships among  
CIS countries is likely to be even greater. 
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Lastly, even though its growth effects may be mixed, as noted by Shleifer and Vishny 
(1994), massive privatization may have been necessary to root out the command economic system 
based on communist ideology.  It may also have been necessary to root out tentacles of the 
communist party reaching almost all sections of the society, and to eliminate the fear of the secret 
police, arbitrary detention and may be execution.  But, giving free reins to animal spirits of 
capitalism is no guarantee of honest new production and innovation.  Animal spirits can also be 
used as freedom for predation, diversion, and rent accumulation.  Prevention of diversion and 
pocketing of gains from investments and technology by bureaucrats, politicians, insiders, 
controlled shareholders, and lawyers/judges is essential.   
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Country Base No. of Y-Equality
Year Yrs. 1991 Gr. Rate w Ger. Yrs Base Year 1991
Bulgaria 1971 20 136.7 1.58 72 3.1 2.3
Hungary 1971 20 119.5 0.89 112 2.7 2.2
Poland 1971 20 83.8 -0.88 2.8 3.3
Romania 1961 30 161.1 1.60 121 6.9 4.3
GeoMean 22 121.8 0.90 142 3.57 2.91
Country Base No. of Y-Equality
Year Yrs. 2013 Gr. Rate w Ger. Yrs 1991 2013
Bulgaria 1991 22 86.6 -0.65 2.3 2.7
Hungary 1991 22 122.4 0.92 86 2.2 1.8
Poland 1991 22 181.6 2.75 44 3.3 1.8
Romania 1991 22 192.7 3.03 49 4.3 2.2
GeoMean 22 138.8 1.50 72 2.91 2.09
SD 0.98 0.43
SD/GM 33.8 20.4
Country Base No. of Y-Equality
Year Yrs. EU Acc Yr Gr. Rate w Ger. Yrs 1991 EU Acc. Yr
Bulgaria 1991 15 73.6 -2.02 2.3 3.1
Hungary 1991 13 118.8 1.33 60 2.2 1.9
Poland 1991 13 139.2 2.58 47 3.3 2.4
Romania 1991 15 135.4 2.04 72 4.3 3.2
GeoMean 14 113.3 0.90 119 2.91 2.59
Bulgaria and Romania joined EU on January 1, 2007 while Hungary and Poland did so on May 1, 2004.
Notes: BHPR stands for Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, and Romania. Data from which the above results 
are derived is from PWT 9.0. See, Kant (2018) for the equation to derive years for full convergence. 
Catch-Up Index Ger/Country PPP PCY
Table 1: Catch-up of BHPR countries 
A) 1961/1971 to 1991
B) 1991 to 2013
C) 1991 to EU Accession
Catch-Up Index Ger/Country PPP PCY
Catch-Up Index Ger/Country PPP PCY
1960/1970-1991 1991 to EU Acc. EU Acc. To 2014
K/L ratio 0.7288* 0.2777* 0.1939***
(0.0387) (0.0151) (0.1181)
Human capital 0.5520* 0.4446 1.8350*
(0.1088) (0.2775) (0.4411)
TFP 0.3143* 0.6706* 0.1934*
(0.0148) (0.0302) (0.0680)
No. of obs. 98 60 38
Panel Unbalanced Unbalanced Unbalanced
Estimation method Random effects Random effects Random effects
or pooled OLS or pooled OLS or pooled OLS
Adj. R-sq 0.9336 0.9418 0.8430
R-sq 0.9356 0.9448 0.8734
Table 2: Growth factors for BHPR countries  
Notes: See above. The numbers in parenthesis are the standard errors of the 
estimated coefficients in the row directly above. * and ***  indicate significance at 1% and 10% 
levels, respectively. The estimation results with pooled OLS are identical to using randm effects 
GLS model. BHPR stands for Bulgaria, Hungry, Poland, and Romania, respectively. 
Country Y-Equality
2013 Gr. Rate w Ger. Yrs 1991 2013
Czech Republic 94.3 -0.27 1.4 1.5
Estonia 148.9 1.83 48 2.4 1.6
Latvia 97.5 -0.12 1.9 2.0
Lithuania 137.1 1.45 58 2.3 1.7
Slovakia 115.5 0.66 98 1.9 1.6
Slovenia 102.8 0.12 378 1.6 1.5
GeoMean 114.3 0.61 104 1.88 1.88
SD 0.39 0.22
SD/GM 20.5 11.5
Croatia 108.6 0.37 223 2.3 2.1
Serbia 118.6 0.78 179 4.0 3.4
GeoMean 113.5 0.58 193 3.03 2.67
SD 1.20 0.92
SD/GM 39.6 34.4
Armenia 105.9 0.26 657 5.6 5.3
Kazakhstan 121.7 0.90 98 2.4 2.0
Kyrgyz Republic 28.8 -5.50 3.9 13.6
Moldova 62.0 -2.15 6.0 9.7
Russian Federation 75.6 -1.26 1.4 1.9
Tajikistan 30.3 -5.28 4.9 16.3
Ukraine 62.6 -2.11 2.7 4.2
GeoMean 61.4 -2.19 3.45 5.64
SD 1.74 5.73
SD/GM 50.5 101.5
Country Y-Equality
2004 Gr. Rate w Ger. Yrs 1991 2004
Czech Republic 92.6 -0.59 1.4 1.5
Estonia 112.4 0.90 97 2.4 2.1
Latvia 77.0 -1.99 1.9 2.5
Lithuania 100.9 0.07 1260 2.3 2.3
Slovakia 91.6 -0.67 1.9 2.0
Slovenia 112.5 0.91 52 1.6 1.4
GeoMean 97.0 -0.23 1.88 1.92
 except 3B where it is 13 years.
Notes: See above. The base year for all countries is 1991 and the number of years is 22 for all panels
Catch-Up Index Ger./Country PPP PCY
Table 3A: Catch-up to Germany of new or reemergent independent countries
I) SBCS countries 
II) Croatia and Serbia
III) CIS countries
3B: Catch-up to Germany for SBCS countries from 1991 to EU Accession
Catch-Up Index Ger./Country PPP PCY
Crotia & Serbia CIS 
1990 to EU Acc. EU Acc. To 2014
K/L Ratio 0.3792* 0.0618*** 0.8276* 0.1932*
(0.0560) (0.0362) (.2010) (.0428)
Human Capital -0.1016 0.8362* -1.6813* -.1211
(0.1335) (0.2748) (0.5012) (0.0916)
TFP 0.7523* 0.7845* 0.3282* 0.4436*
(0.0397) (0.1137) (0.0839) (0.0154)
No. of obs. 90 66 50 175
Method Random effects Random effects Pooled OLS or RE Fixed effects
R-sq 0.8506 (between) 0.3859 (between) 0.7698 0.8420 (within)
Adj. R-sq NA NA 0.7547 NA
Notes: See above. SBCS panels are unbalanced, the other two panels are stongly balanced. SBCS stands
for Slovenia, Baltic countries, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia.
Panel Estimation 
SBCS
Table 4: Growth factors for "new" ex-socialist countries 
Country Y-Equality
2013 Gr. Rate w Ger. Yrs 1991 2013
Austria 107.7 0.34 NA 1.019 0.946
Belgium 98.4 -0.07 1.013 1.029
Denmark 99.3 -0.03 0.998 1.005
Finland 104.4 0.19 70 1.145 1.098
France 92.0 -0.38 1.058 1.149
Greece 89.3 -0.52 1.541 1.726
Ireland 154.9 2.01 NA 1.471 0.949
Italy 82.9 -0.85 1.029 1.241
Luxembourg 121.3 0.88 NA 0.585 0.482
Netherlands 105.0 0.22 NA 1.001 0.953
Portugal 109.9 0.43 133 1.769 1.610
Spain 108.6 0.38 101 1.461 1.345
Sweden 96.9 -0.14 0.977 1.008
UK 95.4 -0.21 1.094 1.146
GM 103.53 0.16 70 1.12 1.08
SD 0.30 0.30
SD/GM 27.1 28.2
Excluding Ireland
GM 100.37 0.02 529 1.094 1.089
SD 0.301 0.312
SD/GM 27.5 28.7
Notes: See above. The base year for all countries is 1991 and the number of years is 22.
Table 5: 2013 Catch-up to Germany for pre-2004 EU countries
Catch-Up Index Ger./Country PPP PCY
Table 6: Growth factors for "new" and "old" EU countries 
Panel Estimation 
BHPR SBCS "Old" EU countries
EU Acc. To 2014 EU Acc. To 2014 1990-2014
K/L Ratio 0.1939*** 0.0618*** -0.1299*
(0.1181) (0.0362) (0.0355)
Human Capital 1.8350* 0.8362* 2.7588*
(0.4411) (0.2748) (0.2943)
TFP 0.1934* 0.7845* 0.3900*
(0.0680) (0.1137) (0.0582)
No. of obs. 38 66 350
Estimation Method Random effects Random effects Fixed effects
R-sq 0.8430 0.3859 (between) 0.2094 (within)
Adj. R-sq 0.8734 NA NA
Notes: See above. BHPR and SBCS panels are unbalanced while "old" EU panel is stongly 
balanced. BHPR stands for Bulgaria, Hungry, Poland, and Romania, respectively, SBCS
stands for Slovenia, Baltic countries, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia and "old EU" for 
pre-2004 members of EU.
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Figure 1: PCY Index 1961-2013, 
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Figure 3: Transition Indicators 1990-2013; 
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Figure 5: External Transition Indicators 1990-
2013; Four Groups of Ex-Socialist Countries
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Figure 6: LS Privatization & Price Lib. TIs 1990-
2013; Four Groups of Ex-Socialist Countries
BHPR SBCS Cro&Ser CIS
